The Law Relating to the Alteration of Negotiable Instruments by Cobb, Fordyce A.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1893
The Law Relating to the Alteration of Negotiable
Instruments
Fordyce A. Cobb
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cobb, Fordyce A., "The Law Relating to the Alteration of Negotiable Instruments" (1893). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection.
Paper 304.
T HE S I S.
THE LAW RELATING TO THE
ALTERATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMNTS.
-By-
FORDYCE A. COBB.
Cornell University Law School.
1893.
C 0 N T E N T S.
Introduction -- I
Contemporaries - 2
History of Alteration ------------------- 4
Definition of Alteration ------------------- 5
Materia ity------------------------------ 6
Time and Date -------------------------- 8
Parties ------------------------------ 10
Place of Payment ---------------------- 12
Amount ------------------------------- 13
Memorandum --------------------------- 14
Reason of Discharge ---------------------- 15
Exceptions ------ --------------- 16
Checks ---------------------------------- 18
Intent ---------------------------------- 21
Presumption as to Intent --------------- 23
Presumption as to Time ----------------- 25
Burden of Proof -------------------------- 27
THE LAW RELATING TO THE
ALTERATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Introduction.
The subject "Alteration' is of vast practical importance
in the business transactions of a civilized and flourishing
community, where commercial paper is frequently substituted
for legal tender, in return for property or services received.
Commerce would be greatly inconvenienced should it be com-
pelled, in all its many lines of business, to proceed strictly
upon a cash basis, and in no manner derive the advantages
afforded by the use of commercial paper in cases where the
parties are widely separated, or in those transactions where
time is required in order that a party may better or improve
his financial standing among business men. But there is this
one feature, where such instruments are employed, which must
be closely watched and guarded, that it be not employed to
change the instrument the parties intended to make when they
entered into the contract, or to unlawfully better the po-
sition of some party or parties to it. It is a subject which
has required and obtained much deep thought and study on the
part of some of the best writers of legal works on the subject
of negotiable paper, to reconcile and bring the many cases
into harmony with each other ; but after all that has been
said and done, each case seems to stand upon its own facts and
surrounding circumstances.
Contemporaries.
Like each poet of the past, Alteration has its contem-
poraries. It is to be distinguished from Forgery on the
one side, and from Spoilation on the other.,
Forgery is the fraudulent making or alteration of an
instrument, with intent to defraud., In order that the
alteration of a negotiable instrument amount to forgery, it
must be done fraudulently, and then is as much forgery as the
making of the instrument outright. Forgery may include
alteration, but it is in nowise necessary that alterations be
forgeries. By forgery, not only the instrument is avoided,
but the debt which constitutes the consideration of the
document is extinguished. Alterations, if innocently made,
are not forgeries, but if material they avoid the instrument,
while action may generally be maintained upon the considera-
tion for which the instrument was given. Forgery, as is
generally understood by the term, applies only to a false
making or signing of an instrument with intent to defraud ;
while Alteration refers to the change made in the terms of
the document after it has been constructed. Thus the two
circumstances can be clearly distinguished from each other.
Now comes the case where the change is made in the terms
of the paper by a stranger to it, as a person to whom it is
given for custody merely. This is not Alteration, but Spoil-
ation. England and Scotland refuse to recognize any dif-
ference in the effect of either, while in America a spoilation
has no effect upon the parties to the instrument so long as
the words are free from doubt, and the intention of the par-
ties can be gathered from them intelligibly. The English
and Scotch rule seems to have its foundation upon the negli-
gence of the holder. The courts of these countries say that
a bill or note is avoided by a material alteration in its
terms, even though the change be made by an entire stranger
to the contract, and found their reasoning on the basis that
the custodian is the person bound to preserve the integrity
of an instrument. The instrument would be avoided if the
change should be made by one of the parties, and therefore is
avoided if made by any other person through that party's
negligencei American courts do not draw the line so closely
as the British. They look at Spoilation from a more humane
point of view. They consider a change so made as a misfortune
to the holder, and he is in no way deemed to be at fault.
The universal rule is to regard the instrument as avoided.
It is said by the New York courts that where a bill is made
unintelligible by a person not a party to it, the instrument
will be treated as virtually destroyed.
History of Alteration.
When the subject first came before the courts, it was
insisted that the avoidance by alteration applied only to
deeds, 'because of their solemn character. The first important
case in England in which this question was considered was
that of Pigot's case, (11 Coke Reports, 26,) where it was
resolved that a material point of the deed being altered, the
instrument was avoided. This case was then followed by
Master v. Muller, in Court of King's Bench, (4 T. Repts.
320,) where this same rule was applied to bills of exchange
and all written instruments. Judge Ashurst said, "There is
no magic in parchment or wax, and the principle to be extract-
ed from the cases is, that any alteration avoids the con-
tract.." Then the question came before the United States
courts, and this same doctrine, now thoroughly established
in England, was asserted and adopted here. New York had
occasion to apply the rule for the first time in the case of
Woodworth v. Bank, (19 Johnson, 391,) in which an indorser was
hela to be discharged by an alteration made after his indorse-
ment, but before inception of the note, by an addition in a
separate memorandum, fixing the place of payment.
Definition of Alteration.
That point in the discussion has now been reached where
the treatment of Alteration should properly be commenced, and
a fitting beginning seems to be made by a definition of the
term itself.! Alteration is an act done upon an instrument
which, without destroying the identity of the document, in-
troduces some change into its terms, meaning, language or
details. But if that which is written upon or erased from
the instrument has no tendency to produce such results, or
mislead a person, it is not an alteration.i Under such cir-
cumstances, the part added or stricken out would be immaterial
and have no effect upon the document. This frequently hap-
6pens in the addition of words implied by law, or the striking
out of words of no importance, as the description of A in his
signature to a note -- "A, Cashier, First National Bank."
This latter being stricken out, the act done is held immater-
ial to the validity of the document. Such is the case whether
the act was done fraudulently or innocently, so long as it
is immaterial in effect.
Materiality.
Now comes the extremely important question : 'hen is
an alteration material ? This is necessarily the first
question to be decided, for upon this is hinged the validity
of the instrument. If material, the parties to the instrument
are discharged. If not, they are still bound.
If a change is made in the terms of a written contract,
which varies its original legal effect or operation, whether
in respect to the legal obligation it imports, or its force
as a matter of evidence, when made by a party thereto, the
alteration is a material one, and the parties are discharged.
If the document is made to speak a language legally different
from that which it originally spoke, it is material ; and
unless all the parties give their express or implied consent
to the change, the legal obligation of the instrument is
destroyed, whether made with or without a fradulent intent.
The reason for so holding the instrument avoided, is to pre-
vent fraud, in the first instance ; and, secondly, to secure
the identity of the document. Of course, if the parties
consent, they will be bound by the instrument as altered, for
in effect it is the formation of a new and independent con-
tract. In England, if such alteration was made after the
instrument was issued, the bill or note would still be declar-
ed invalid, as under the Stamp Act, all new agreements must
have their stamp.? Under this act, the time when the bill
was issued becomes of importance. This provision has not been
adopted in America, and for that reason the question has no
weight in the United States. In the case of Speak v. U. S.',,
(9 Cranch, 38,) one of the names on the bond was erased and
another substituted in its place by consent of the parties.,
Judge Story said, in that case, "It is clear at common law
that an alteration or addition in a deed, as by adding a new
obligor, or by striking out an obligor's name, if done with
consent or concurrence of all parties to the deed, does not
avoid it.'"
Those parts of a bill or note which if changed by one of
the parties will amount to a material alteration, and the
parties to the instrument be discharged therefrom, are date,
time, place of payment, amount of interest or principal, and
number and relation of the parties. Some authorities add
the following material parts to the list : change in
general character or effect of the instrument as matter of
obligation or evidence ; currency in which payment is to be
made ; and, finally, by adding some new provision, striking
out some provision, or substituting one provision for another.
The question of materiality arises most frequently upon the
five cases first named, and when it is up for decision it is
a question of law for the court, and never a question of fact
for the jury. (Oliver Y. Hawley, 5 Neb. 444 ; 2 Wend.
255 ; 22 Pa. St. 207.)
Time and Date.
Time is almost identical with date and constitutes a
material change of the instrument, if it be made in the year,
month or day of the bill or note, or a bill on demand is made
to read after date, or a substitution of "after date" for
"after sight.* Time is the counterpart of Date. The
mention of one includes the other.
Date derives its significance from the facts that it
shows when the bill or note becomes a contract, in many cases
the time when the contract is to be performed, while many
circumstances may arise making it of vast importance when the
bill or note was issued.
Tennessee courts hold that the date of indorsement is
not material, but such rule cannot be readily adopted, for a
serious phase of the question as to materiality may arise when
it is sought to find whether the indorsement was made before
or after maturity. In the case of Wood v. Steele, (6 Wall.,
80,) there appeared upon the face of the instrument that
'September' had been stricken out, and "Oct. 11" substituted
as the date. This was done after Steele had signed as
surety for one Newson, without Wood's or Steele's knowledge
or consent. The court held that Steele was discharged from
all liability.
In Crawford v. West Side Bank, (100 N. Y. 56,) the
plaintiff drew his check on defendant, dated April 22, payable
to his clerk, who was directed by him to draw the money on
that day and pay employees of the plaintiff. The clerk
altered the check to April '21st", drew the money and left
the locality. Plaintiff sought to recover a balance upon
10
account. The defendant sought to set up the payment of this
altered check, as part of the balance due plaintiff. This
he was unable to do, as there was no negligence on the part
of the plaintiff in leaving blanks unfilled or in any way aid-
ing in the commission of the fraud by the clerk in whose
hands the check was placed, and the check had never become
a valid instrument for any purpose, as before its inception
it was vitiated by a fraudulent alteration.
Parties.
It is a settled mle in England and America, that change
in the number or relation of the parties to a bill or note is
a material alteration. The case of Chappel v. Spencer,
(23 Barb. 584,) first laid down the rule. Here the payee of
a note,before its maturity, transferred it to another, and,
for the purpose of giving his own personal security to the
purchaser, wrote his name upon the note, under the name of
the maker and added the word 'security', without any fradulent
intent. The court said this was such an alteration as to
vitiate the note, and was borne out in its decision by the
case of Gardiner v. Walch, (32 Eng. L. Bepts. 162,) where it
was said that the other party to the instrument would be
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discharged from his liability if the altered instrument would
operate differently from the original instrument, whether the
change be or be not to his prejudice.
Where such names are added, the note instead of being
the several or joint obligation of the original party or
parties, becomes the joint or joint and several undertakings
of different parties. It has been thought that the rule as
given in the Chappel case had been overruled in New York by
the later cases of McCaughey v. Smith, (27 N.Y. 39,) and
Brown v. Winnie, (29 N. Y. 400.) This is not the case, how-
ever, in this State. In the last cited case, Winnie altered
the instrument in his own favor, and when action was brought
upon it he set up the alteration as a defense, which is con-
trary to all principles of justice to allow. In the first
cited case, it was stated that the addition of the name of
another person to a several note as maker, without knowledge
or consent of the original signer, is not such a material
alteration as will avoid the note. This case, at the first
glance, appears to directly overthrow the Chappel case, but
in reality it does not have that effect, nor does it so pro-
fess to act. One Hungerford signed the several note of one
Hall after it was made, delivered and indorsed by Smith.
The judge who wrote the opinion recognized the doctrine of
the Chappel case, in 23 Barb. 584, as good and subsisting
law, but shunned it, as a traveller would a plague-infected
city, by holding Hungerford a guarantor of the note, and not
a maker. Therefore, the early case is still the New York
rule as to change of parties.
Place of Payment.
This has also been held a material part of a negotiable
instrument, and its change avoids the instrument, unless con-
sented to when made. The best example of it is in the early
case in New York of Nazro v. Fuller, (24 Wend. 373,) where
action was brought upon a promissory note which had been
altered after delivery of possession to payees, they having
inserted the words, 'Payable at Wayne County Bank." The
defendant sought to show that the insertion was a mere
memorandum, which was immaterial ; but the court said it was
not a memorandum, but a part of the contract, and its inser-
tion was material, was inserted by a party to be benefited
thereby, and therefore the note was wholly void.
Amount.
This is the next material part of a bill or note to
attract attention with reference to its alteration. It is
spoken of in reports as forgery, which shows how closely the
two terms are linked together. The most common way of pro-
ducing this change is by introducing figures between the
dollar sign and the amount written on the note. This was
done in the case of Greenfield Bank v. Stowell, (123 Mass.
196,) where a note drawn for sixty-seven dollars was made to
read "four hundred, sixty-seven dollars", and it was held
that the holder could not recover of the maker. The doctrine
founded by this case is denied in several States, New York
and Pennsylvania among them, on the grounds of the negligence
of the maker in leaving such blanks. They seem to have lost
sight of the facts that a change committed in this manner, or
any other, could not create a contract on the part of the
maker, and that when committed in this way is no less liable
to be detected. These courts state as a general rule that
where one writes out a bill or note so as to leave spaces
which can be easily filled without exciting suspicion, and
the note is altered by filling in such spaces, he will 'have
to suffer the consequences of his negligence and be liable to
a bona fide holder for value. This rule is hardly just or
equitable, and surely it places a severe precision upon a
business community. If promissory notes are only given by
first-class business men who are skilled in drawing them in
the best possible manner to prevent forgery, it may be well
to adopt a high standard of accuracy and perfection, which
the argument on the part of the plaintiff requires. But for
the great mass of people such a standard would be entirely too
high and would tend to encourage forgery, by the protection it
would give to knaves and their forged paper.)
Memorandum.
It is always a question, to be determined upon the cir-
cumstances, whether a memorandum upon a bill or note is in-
tended as a part of the contract and a modification of the
instrument, or whether it is merely an ear-mark for the pur-
pose of identification. When the latter is the case, and it
is so situated as to be easily detached without defacing the
instrument, it does not modify the contract, nor does it have
any effect upon it., But the addition of a memorandum to a
note, by which it is materially affected, will avoid it ;
and where the memorandum modifies the note or consideration,
and the note is torn off and negotiated, the instrument is
again invalid. In Benedict v. Cowden, (49 N. Y, 396,) a
memorandum made at the foot of a promissory note, stating
the manner of payment, and intended as a part of the contract,
was cut off, and the note thus altered was negotiated to a
bona fide holder for value. The plaintiff was unable to
recover upon the note, as the memorandum was so substantive a
part of the contract as though inserted in the body of the
instrument. The two combined formed the contract.,
Reason of Discharge.
The reason why these different changes amount to a dis-
charge is obvious. The agreement is no longer the one into
which the defendant entered. Its identity is changed ; an-
other is substituted without his consent, and by one who has
no power to consent for him-. There is no longer the necessa-
ry concurrence of minds. If the instrument is under seal, he
may plead that it is not his deed, and, if it be not under
seal, that he did not so promise. To prevent and punish such
tampering, the law does not permit the plaintiff to fall back
on the contract as it was originally. But in pursuance of a
stern and wise policy, it annuls the instrument as to a party
sought to be wronged.
Exceptions.
There are exceptions, however, to the general rule that
all parties to a bill or note are discharged from all liabili-
ty thereon by a material alteration, when made by a party
interested and without the other's consent.
1. If an altered bill is restored to its original form
and transferred to a bona fide holder, he may recover against
all parties,.
2. A bill may be altered at any time for the purpose
of correcting a mistake and conforming the instrument to the
intention of the parties at the time of issue.
The case of Kountz v. Kennedy, (63 Pa. St. 187,) is a
fine case illustrating these points. One Hunt gave his note
to Kennedy for a printing office. The note was soon after
indorsed by Kennedy to the plaintiff, who immediatley return-
ed the note to Hunt's clerk, saying that it was to be on in-
terest. The clerk, with Hunt's consent, inserted "with in-
terest.' The note was unpaid at maturity, and plaintiff sued
the indorser. He offered the note as evidence, with the
The court held that this was not a fraudaddition removed.
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upon the indorser, and he was still liable. The note was the
same as when he indorsed it. It had been returned to its
original shape. The identity of the note remained, and there
was nothing in it to enlarge the obligation of the indorser,
and as what was done was done innocently but mistakenly,
and expunged perhaps within an hour of the time when inserted,
there is no rule of law so unreasonable as to hold it avoided
by this actv
Of course, where a note has been materially injured by
an innocent alteration, it is within the power of a court of
equity to decree the restoration of the instrument to its
original form, and suit may be brought upon it directly.
As to mistake, a bill dated '1822', when it was the year
1823, was changed by the agent of the drawer and acceptor, and
was held not to invalidate the bill. In another case, a
drawer intended to make a bill negotiable and indorsed it over
omitting the words 'or order.' Their subsequent insertion,
in pursuance of the original intention, did not make the bill
void.
With reference to the latter clause of the second excep-
tion, as to conforming to the original intention of the par-
ties, a good illustration is the case of Cole v. Hills, (44
18
N. H. 244.) Both parties intended to make a note payable to
B. C?, but it was accidently written 'B. R. C." The "R,' was
erased by the payee, after delivery, and this act was held
by the court not to discharge the parties, as it was immater-
ial.
Retracing names or words in an instrument, which have
become dimmed by blots, or obscure from other means, does not
avoid the obligation ; nor writing over with ink words
written with a pencil ; or, in the case where a third person
who has written the note and with whom it is left, in good
faith, changes the date, but on the maker's disproval restores
it to its original form.-
Whether the intent of an alteration is to vary the
original contract or merely to correct a mistake, is always
a question of fact for the jury.-
Checks.
Although checks have not been mentioned before, what has
been already said relating to bills and notes refers equally
as well to checks. Where altered checks, commonly known as
'raised paper1 , have been paid by banks, the general rule is
that the money so paid may be recovered from the party receiv-
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ing it, as a transaction without consideration. The bank is
bound to know the drawer's signature only, and in absence of
any circumstances which inflict injury upon another party,
there is no reason why the bank should not be reimbursed.
If a bank certifies a check, it is not thereby pre-
cluded from showing an alteration ; nor does the declaration
to
of a teller as Athe validity of the instrument preclude the
showing of such defect.- The case of Securitr Bank v. National
Bank , (67 N. Y. 461,) illustrates this principle in a very
good light. A raised check was taken to the bank and
certified by the teller. The person presenting it said he
did not like the appearance of the person who brought it to
him and he wanted it closely examined before it was certified.
The teller said it was a good check in every particular and
drawn upon one of the directors of that bank., When the case
was contested, the Court of Appeals held that the teller
could only bind the bank to the extent of the genuineness of
the drawer's signature, and farther than that was merely a
statement of the teller's opinion.
In check cases, the question of negligence frequently
arises. When it does, the courts universally rule that the
loss must fall upon the party whose negligence has been the
20
means of producing the fraud. In v. Bank of Cincinnati,
(18 Wall. 605,) Stall and Myer were customers and depositors
with the defendants' bank. They drew their check on that
bank for the sum of $26.50, payable to Mrs. E. Hart, and
delivered it to a stranger to all the parties to the tran-
saction, who represented himself to be Mrs. Hart's agent.,
The stranger erased the payee's name, and also the amount for
which the check was given. He then inserted the name of Espy,
Heidelbach & Co., Bankers and Brokers, as payee, and $3920 as
the amount. He passed the check to this firm in payment for
bonds and gold which he purchased from them. The check was
paid by the bank, through the clearing house, and on the
following day the fraud was discovered. Espy made demand for
the amount paid through mistake, and the court ruled that
where money is paid on a raised check by mistake, neither
party being in default, it may be recovered as paid without
consideration. But if either party has been guilty of
negligence or carelessness, by which the other party has been
injured, the negligent party must bear the loss.
Intent-.
The first important question that has to be decided in
treating of Alteration cases is, whether the change made was
or was not in a material part of the bill or note. The
second important question that is now to be considered is,
whether the alteration was made with an innocent or fraudu-
lent intent.' Of course, if it was fraudulantly made, the
instrument is destroyed, and likewise the debt which it was
intended to cover. But, on the other hand, large amounts may
be saved to the holder of the altered bill or note, where
innocently made, by reason of his right to recover upon the
consideration for which the document was issued to him'
Text writers commonly make the statement that the holder
of a bill which has been avoided by a material alteration
cannot recover upon the consideration in respect to which it
was negotiated to him. They do not intend this, however,
as a rule to be strictly applied in all cases, but exclude
those cases where the bill was negotiated to the holder after
alteration, he being not privy thereto, cases where the party
sued would not have had any remedy over on the bill if it had
not been altered, and lastly those cases where he did not
intend to commit a fraud by the alteration. The cases
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commonly cited by writers in support of such statements, are
V., Huneke, (55 N. Y. 412,) and Wheelock v. Truman, (13
Pick. 165.) Both were cases of a fraudulent act and with
fraudulent intent. In the first named case, a note drawn for
$1000.00 had inserted in it by the plaintiff, without the
defendant's knowledge, the words "with interest'. The
plaintiff was unable to recover on the note or the considera-
tion, because it was fraudulently altered by the plaintiff to
defraud the debtor and improve the creditor's own position.,
In the second case, the court recognized the same doctrine,
where a memorandun to a note, which was essential and con-
stituted one of its stipulations, was detached and the re-
mainder of the note sued upon by the party detaching the
clause.
It has been said that the obvious policy of the rule
which avoids a written contract on the account of a fraudu-
lent alteration was to prevent fraud, and it is apparent that
if the party guilty of the fraud may found a claim upon the
original consideration, the rule would be defeated. To
allow parties to take the chances of success in fraudulently
raising the amount of written obligations of their debtors
without risk of loss in detection, would be an encouragement
23
to this description of fraud which the law should not afford.
And alterations of the instruments by the holders thereof,
such as to destroy their identity, in V v. iper, (34 Ill.
100,) and Hunt v. Grey, (35 N. J. Law,) did not cancel the
debt of which the instruments were evidence, where they were
innocently made -, Courts have even gone farther than this,
but in the same channel., In Fraker v. Little, (24 Kan.
598,) the court said that where a party makes a payment on a
bill, from which he is discharged by reason of an alteration,
he may recover the amount so paid, on the ground of money
paid by mistake.
Presumption as to Intent.!
As to whether an alteration will be presumed fraudulently
made, or made innocently and in good faith, is a question
that is not settled in this country. The weight of authority
probably, is in favor of holding the change fraudulently
made. Generally, when an alteration is shown, the burden
is upon the holder to show that the alteration was made in-
nocently by himself or by another for a proper purpose, in the
absence of which, it is presumed to have been made fraudu-
lentlyv The cases of Robinson v. Reed, (46 Iowa, 221,)
Wheeler v. Freeman, (13 Pick. 165,) and Wardner, Bushnell &
Clessnor Co. v. W illard, (49 N. W. 300,) illustrate this
principle. In this latter case, the court said the plaintiff
must show the absence of a fraudulent intent in the altera-
tion, or when the most glaring forgeries are committed the
maker or party sought to be charged would have to discover
the motive of the forger and establish it by proof, which
would be well nigh impossible in every case., In Hartley v :
Corboy, (150 Pa. St.,) a promissory note, showing on its face
a material alteration, was not admissible in evidence without
showing the change to have been made lawfully. On the other
hand, in the case of Franklyn v. Baker, (27 N. E.7 550, ) it
was claimed by the defendant that the promissory note upon
which suit was brought had been altered since execution.
It was held that the burden was upon him to show that it was
not so altered, for it was presumed to have been innocently
made until the contrary was shown. If before execution, it
did not effect the validity ; but if after, and without
consent of the maker, it was a crime which the law would not
pre sume.
Presumption as to Time.
The latter part of the decision of the court in this last
case brings up the presumption as to the time when the altera-
tion is made in the instrument. Here again are the courts
of the different States of this country at variance. In
the case of s v. Bankers' Insurance Co., (46 N. W. 1114,)
the court said it was incumbent upon the party alleging the
alteration to prove it, since there was no presumption that
it was made after, but was made before delivery. While in
Hesse's Appeal, (19 At. 434,) in the case of an altered
check, the court said that the burden of proof was on the
holder, to show by competent proof either that the altera-
tion was made before execution, or after with the drawer's
consent. It may be said, however, that many of the courts
have adopted a criterion by which the question of presumption
as to time may be decided. They take into consideration the
general appearance of the instrument and all the surrounding
circumstances. If the alteration is not suspicious or benefi-
cial to the holder, the alteration is presumed to have been
made prior to or contemporaneous with the execution of the
document. This is the rule laid down in Connecticut and
Ohio, and lately passed upon and affirmed in the highest court
of Texas. In the case of Stillwell v. Patton, (18 S. W.
1075,) where a note was written on poor paper, the figures
and signature blurred as though blotted with a newspaper, but
the same kind of ink used throughout, the court said there
was no cause of suspicion, and honesty was presumed.
On the contrary, if the alteration be one of a suspi-
cious character or beneficial to the holder, fraud will be
presumed against him, and the benefit derived by the presump-
tion of honesty will be lost to him. Upon this point is the
case of Bowman v. Mitchell, (79 Ind. 84,) In New York, a
material alteration is held to create such a suspicion, as
is shown by a case in 22 Wend. 387. But a mere interlinea-
tion is not sufficient to create such a suspicion. The case
of National. Bank v. Mvadden, (114 N. Yv 280,) was that of a
check indorsed by the payee and made to appear as having been
altered after payee's indorsement and without his consent.
The alteration was presumed to have been so made as to vitiate
the instrument as against the indorser, and the burden was
upon the party seeking to enforce it to relieve it from the
offect of the change, by showing it to have been made by a
stranger to the instrument.,
Burden of Proof.
The subject of Alteration has now been treated with
reference to its scope, its history, how constituted, when it
is so made as to affect the instrument, presumption of intent
of the parties making the change, presumption as to time when
made, and now comes the final important division, previously
referred to herein, but not so fully treated as it deserves,-
namely, Burden of Proof. The most common cases that have
arisen and been considered are those in which the alteration
has appeared upon the face of the instrument, although there
have been cases in which the alteration was non-apparent ; and
consequently a different rule has had to be propounded for
these cases, which would not be of weight in deciding the
first class named. Here, as is shown by U. S., v. Ln, (1
Howard, 104,) the burden of proof is upon the party alleging
the alteration. In England, where the alteration appears upon
the face of a bill or note, it lies upon the plaintiff to
show that it was made under such circumstances as not to
vitiate the instrument, and he cannot recover by merely show-
ing that he is a holder for value before maturity. In
America, as has been seen, the cases are not entirely harmo-
nious ; but the English rule is considered by the weight of
authority to be the just holding. This is a reasonable
ruling, for if it was thrown upon the defendant to show that
the alteration was improperly made, it might be a great hard-
ship, for he may have no means of proving that the bill went
unaltered from his hands, or showing the circumstances of the
subsequent alteration. But there is no hardship on the part
of the plaintiff, for if the bill was altered in his hands,
he may and ought to account for it. If before, then he took
it with the marks of suspicion on its face, which ought to
have induced him either to have refused it entirely, or
required evidence of the circumstances under which the altera-
tion was made. Clearly he is the party in default and should
bear the burden of explaining and extricating himself. He
must know the circumstances which induced the alteration, and
to require the party wronged to go into the enemy's camp for
evidence would aid in the invention of fraud.
The question of burden of proof first arose in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Simpson v.
Stackhouse, (9 Barr, 186,) where Chief Justice Gibson con-
sidered the underlying principle of such proof, and I can do
no better than quote his words as follows : "He who takes
a blemished bill or note, takes it with its imperfections on
its head. He becomes sponsor for them, and though he acts
honestly, he acts negligently. But the law presumes against
negligence as a degree of culpability, and it presumes that
he had not only satisfied himself of the innocence of the
transaction, but had provided himself with the proof of it to
meet a scrutiny he had reason to expect. It is of no little
weight, too, that the instrument is found in his hands, and
that no other person else can be called upon to speak of it,
for without a presumption to sustain him, the maker would in
every case be defenseless. It may be said that the holder
with such presumptions against him would also be defenseless.
But it was his fault to take such a note. As bills and notes
are intended for circulation, and as payees do not usually
receive them clogged with impediments in their circulation,
there is a presumption that such an instrument starts fair
and untarnished, which stands until repelled, and the holder
ought, therefore, to explain why he took it branded with
marks of suspicion which would render it unfit for his purpose.
The maker cannot be expected to account for what may have
happened to it after leaving his hands, but the payee who
takes it discredited and condemned on its face ought to be
prepared to show what it was when it was received by him,,
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The very fact that he received it is presumptive evidence that
it was unaltered at the time, and, to say the least, his
folly or knavery raises a suspicion that it is his duty to
remove w'
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